spoke digital films

Charles Ferguson was waiting for someone else to make this film. In 2005, after finding that no one seemed to be making a film specifically about America’s policy in Iraq, he decided to take matters into his own hands and embark on his own documentary. The result is “No End in Sight: The American Occupation of Iraq,” a damning indictment of the execution of the Iraq war by members of the Bush Administration.

Yes, Ferguson is a first-time filmmaker which makes this powerful documentary all the more impressive. It’s not as though he was a starving artist who got his big break with this production, however. Ferguson holds a Ph.D. in political science from MIT (with an undergrad degree in mathematics). He was once a consultant to the White House, presumably during the first Bush Administration (his website is a bit ambiguous as to the time frame), and also consulted to major national and international corporations. Ferguson later became a software developer who eventually sold his company, Vermeer Technologies, to Microsoft in 1996. After that successful business venture, Ferguson returned to academic work and was a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution for three years. In short, a man of his means and connections could afford to wake up one morning and decide to become a filmmaker. Given the quality of “No End in Sight”, I’m glad he did.

I should start by saying what this film is not. It makes no effort to evaluate the wisdom or morality of invading Iraq in the first place. I’m not at all sure of Ferguson’s opinion on this matter, and the film offers few obvious clues (a huge strength in my opinion.) What I do know is that Ferguson is no pacifist and I would presume his politics are well to the right of my own (admittedly far-left) politics. This film narrows its exploration strictly to the policy choices regarding the invasion and occupation of Iraq. I feel this decision greatly broadens the potential audience and likely increased Ferguson’s access to many of the primary players in the occupation. Whether or not those who chose to participate did so to cover their asses or salvage their reputations, my impression was that most spoke surprisingly candidly.

Unfortunately, one of the players he failed to access was Paul Bremer, the head Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (Ferguson said in an interview on Charlie Rose that Bremer originally agreed to an interview but later backed out.) Bremer is given an enormous amount of blame for failed decisions in Iraq. Not only was Bremer criticized by his collegues for profoundly unwise decisions, but also for his arrogance in implementing them. Prior to establishing the Coalition Provisional Autority, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) had been in charge of the occupation. ORHA officials, who had worked for months forging relationships and evaluating the situation on the ground from a first-hand point of view, describe Bremer as having little interest in their opinions when he arrived to take over.

The decision made by Bremer and tiny number of Administration officials to disband the Iraqi Army is seen as perhaps the most catastrophic decision. Many of the interviewees in the film (including Richard Armitage, then Deputy Secretary of State and Colin Powell’s right hand man) questioned the wisdom of a policy that instantly rendered unemployed tens of thousands of armed men, many of whom later became insurgents as desperation gripped the country. A decision made in Washington by less than ten men who had yet to even arrive in Iraq, the disbanding of the military came as a shock to the ORHA officials already on the ground in Baghdad. The ORHA officials reported numerous efforts by Iraqis to offer military assistance and organization of troops which could provide security in the country. They described men who were not Sadaam loyalists, but simply career officers hoping to put food on their table. Instead, they were sent away with no job, no money, and almost no options in a country that would soon devolve into violence and chaos.

The film provides dozens of other decisions that proved to be disastrous and sometimes shocking in their lack of basic competency. One was the policy that soldiers were not tasked to prevent looting. Another was the failure to secure areas where large stockpiles of weapons were stored. Yet another was the failure to secure any of the administrative ministries - the only exception being the Oil Ministry according to the film. Lastly, almost no one in any position of authority, including Paul Bremer (and even his Media Director) spoke any Arabic whatsoever.

In short, the film describes a war implemented with a profound lack of planning seemingly guided only by a toxic mixture of arrogance, naivete, and an unwillingness to face realities that conflicted with the blind faith of Neo-Con architects. So, it rarely tells us anything we don’t already know, but it combines impressive access to key figures, strong imagery from the war, and taut storytelling to deliver an important record of history. While some might be disappointed that the film never questions the morality of the decision to go to war, I found it’s critique more devastating as a result. There have been several excellent documentaries dealing with Iraq, and I put this one near the top of that list.